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DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF NONTENURED
TEACHERS-NONRENEWAL OF CONTRACT
INTRODUCTION
When a person is employed by the State, numerous legal con-
flicts arise between the power of the employer-state and the rights
of the employee-citizen. Because of the nature of teaching, i.e.
public presentation of various doctrines, any of which may be dia-
metrically opposed to those espoused by the hiring body, the con-
flict is more crystalline than in many other governmental positions.
This Comment will concentrate not on the freedoms retained by the
citizen-teacher but on the duties owed him by the employer-state.
Specifically, the issue under consideration will be whether the gov-
ernmental unit responsible for hiring the teacher must grant that
teacher a statement of reasons and a hearing prior to dismissal.
The issue will further be narrowed to one such employee, the non-
tenured teacher.
For the purposes of this Comment, "teacher" and "professor"
will be loosely synonymous unless otherwise specified. Further-
more, within the context of the question as presented, "due process
rights" will be used to signify the right to a statement of reasons
and a hearing. It is recognized that teachers have certain other due
process rights, such as freedom from arbitrary and capricious dis-
missal;' such rights, however, will not be amplified herein.
In recently decided companion cases, the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled on the question of due process rights of non-
tenured professors. Both cases involved professors at state-op-
erated colleges and the right to a statement of reasons and a hear-
ing prior to termination or nonrenewal of the teaching contract.
In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,2 the Court held that
no such due process rights existed. In Perry v. Sindermann,3 the
opposite result was implied, although the case was remanded for
further consideration. The focus of this Comment will be on those
two decisions with their effect measured against Pennsylvania law.
The legal groundwork regarding the central issue-whether a
teacher under state auspices has a constitutional right to a state-
ment of reasons and a hearing prior to dismissal-has been estab-
1. See, e.g., Nicolella v. School Bd., 444 Pa. 541, 281 A.2d 832 (1971),
cited at notes 116-18 infra.
2. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
3. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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lished by the lower courts; a discussion of such cases is necessary
to provide the background facing the Court at the time of the de-
cisions.
Discussing the lower court decisions, the Supreme Court
noted: "The courts that have had to decide whether a nontenured
public employee has a right to a statement of reasons or a hearing
have come to varying conclusions."'4 The most notable case is Orr
v. Trinter,5 in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined
that no procedural safeguards were required. Other Circuit Court
decisions cited by the Supreme Court to the same effect
were Jones v. Hopper6 and Freeman v. Gould Special School Dis-
trict.7 In the Jones case, although the Supreme Court is correct
in its explanation of the holding, the reasoning is more closely
aligned with the Fifth Circuit "expectancy of employment" de-
cisions.
The "expectancy of employment" rationale was established by
Judge Learned Hand in a decision primarily concerned with tort
law, specifically interference with prospective advantage, rather
than on the constitutional question." Nevertheless, the phrase was
imbued into due process considerations by the Fifth Circuit,9 thus
establishing the criterion of "expectancy of employment" as the
basis for entitlement to a statement of reasons and a hearing. The
concept was expanded by a later case to the determination that
"[t]he substance of due process required that no instructor who
has an expectancy of continued employment be deprived of that
expectancy by mere ceremonial compliance with procedural due
process."'10
The First Circuit solution to the question of due process rights
of nontenured teachers effectively compromised the interests in-
volved: the teacher upon nonrenewal can demand a statement of
reasons but not a hearing." The result, although commendable in
that it imposes the least possible burden on the administration
while simultaneously granting the teacher at least some indication
of the cause of his dismissal, leaves unanswered the question of
4. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 n.6
(1972).
5. 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972).
See notes 83-90 and accompanying text infra.
6. 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970).
7. 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
8. Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947).
9. Pred v. Bd. of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1970).
10. Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
11. Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971).
whether the status of a nontenured teacher, standing alone, merits
constitutional protection. To that question, the Supreme Court
has answered an equivocal no.
12
I. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
In view of the seemingly disparate decisions 13 by the Court in
Roth and Sindermann, both decisions will be analyzed in detail, in-
cluding the prior history of each case as it relates to the subsequent
decisions. Because the decisions are most easily explained in rela-
tion to each other, the discussion of the final determination has
been relegated to a separate section. In addition, earlier cases
that serve to elucidate the two principal cases will be mentioned.
A. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth
In Roth, the respondent, David Roth, was a political science
professor at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh. Roth's "con-
tract" consisted of a letter notifying him of his appointment to the
faculty for the academic year. The notice further provided that
the appointment was subject to Wisconsin tenure laws1 4 then in
effect and that "[t]he employment of any staff member shall not
be for a term beyond June 30th of the fiscal year in which the ap-
pointment is made."" Roth's appointment was his first on the
faculty. During the course of the year, Roth made statements crit-
ical of the university administration and was subsequently notified
that his contract would not be renewed. Although the terms of
the contract regarding nonrenewal were complied with, Roth was
given "no reason for the decision and no opportunity to challenge
it at any sort of hearing."' 6
Roth filed suit in district court, seeking declaratory relief, in
the form of a required hearing, and court-ordered reinstatement.
17
Among other contentions, Roth alleged that his first, fifth and
fourteenth amendment' 8 rights had been violated because the
12. See notes 44-79 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 2-3 and accompanying text supra.
14. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566 nn.
1 & 2 (1972). The Wisconsin statute construed by the Court, Wis. STAT.
§ 37.31 (1965), read as follows:
(1) All teachers in any state university shall initially be em-
ployed on probation. The employment shall be permanent, during
efficiency and good behavior after 4 years of continuous service in
the state university system as a teacher.
Under the present version of the statute, the requisite service is extended
to six years. Wis. STAT. § 37.31 (Supp. 1972), amending Wis. STAT. §
37.31 (1965).
15. 408 U.S. at 566 n.1.
16. Id. at 568.
17. Roth v. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D.
Wis. 1970).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law.., abridging
freedom of speech. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall ... be
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
nonrenewal was occasioned by the exercise of first amendment
freedoms and the lack of a statement of reasons and a hearing de-
prived him of his due process rights.19 On competing motions for
summary judgment, the court granted partial relief to Roth by
ordering a statement of reasons and a hearing "because said de-
cision[to terminate] was not made under ascertainable and de-
finite standards .... ,,2o Thus at an early stage in the proceedings
the constitutional question of dismissal for the exercise of protected
freedoms was subordinated to the procedural issue, the question
that ultimately reached the Supreme Court.
The district court utilized the balancing test dictated by Cafe-
teria Workers v. McElroy2" and decided the interests in the situa-
tion presented were weighted in favor of the plaintiff, although
not without an element of judicial uncertainty.22 The court's prin-
cipal concern was the consequence to the career of professors arbi-
trarily dismissed for causes that may be "wholly without reason."23
The court thus concluded:
Minimal procedural due process includes a statement of the
reasons why the university intends not to retain the pro-
fessor, notice of a hearing at which he may respond to the
stated reasons, and a hearing if the professor appears at
the appointed time and place. . . . Only if he makes a rea-
sonable showing that the stated reasons are wholly inap-
propriate as a basis for decision or that they are wholly
without basis in fact would the university administration
become obliged to show that the stated reasons are appro-
priate or that they have a basis in fact.
24
It is of interest to note that even under this ruling in favor of
the teacher, the burden of proof cast upon him would render any
criticism substantiated by the university an adequate cause for dis-
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, Section 1. "[N]or shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
19. 310 F. Supp. at 974.
20. Id. at 983.
21. 367 U.S. 886 (1960).
22. Commenting on the colleges' interests, the court stated:
If the university is forbidden, constitutionally, to rest its deci-
sion on such an arbitrary basis, the question arises: in practice
will the university become so inhibited that the available spectrum
of reasons in the two situations [tenure and nontenure] will merge,
the distinction between tenure and absence of tenure will shrink
and disappear and the university will be unable to rid itself of
newcomers whose inadequacies are promptly sensed but not
easily defined? It will not do to ignore this danger to the institu-
tion and to its central mission of teaching and research.
310 F. Supp. at 979.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 980.
missal. The defendant in its answer had alleged that the decision
to terminate had been based, inter alia, on "violation of duty, viola-
tion of university rules, and insubordination .... ,,25 Thus had a
hearing been held, it would appear that the plaintiff would be a
rare professor indeed if the Regents could not have shown, at a
minimum, some violation of university rules. Would such a show-
ing be sufficient, particularly if the professor was one whose "in-
adequacies are promptly sensed and grave but not easily de-
fined?"26 The court leaves unanswered the minimum criteria for
contract termination, in large part due to its attempt to prohibit
an unconstitutional dismissal while preserving the considerable
latitude27 of college administrators to dismiss teachers whose main
fault is educational ineptitude, incidentally augmented by anti-ad-
ministration exercises of free speech. The judicial reconciliation
of these two viewpoints is a problem common to most cases dealing
with the due process rights of dismissed teachers.
The court of appeals affirmed the decision,28 with Senior Cir-
cuit Judge Duffy dissenting. The majority primarily restated the
district court reasoning while admitting that Supreme Court de-
cisions left the issue unresolved.29 The court of appeals did add a
further reason for the necessity of a statement of reasons and a
hearing, i.e., "as a prophylatic against non-retention decisions im-
properly motivated by exercise of protected rights. '30
Judge Duffy's dissent is of particular importance because of
the similarity of his reasoning to the Supreme Court's ultimate ra-
tionale. He concluded:
[T] he State's interest in preserving a workable system of
tenure which includes, almost by definition, the ability to
select freely and maturely its non-tenured teaching person-
nel, far outweighs any expectancy David Roth might have
had in continued employment at Wisconsin State Univer-
sity.
31
The dissent underscores the futility of a hearing since the professor,
receiving an adverse result, "will, quite naturally, seek relief in the
federal courts and . . .will feel free to ignore all the proceedings
that have transpired before." 32 In addition, Judge Duffy, taking
judicial notice of the buyer's market in teaching talent, commented
upon the unnecessary burden that will be placed on the colleges if
they must grant hearings before dismissal while in the process of
"upgrading their younger faculties by extensive substitutions as
25. Id. at 974.
26. Id. at 979. See note 22 supra.
27. 310 F. Supp. at 978.
28. Roth v. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir.
1971).
29. Id. at 809.
30. Id. at 810.
31. Id. at 814.
32. Id. at 811.
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better qualified applicants become plentiful."3  From the court of
appeals decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
3 4
B. Perry v. Sindermann
In Sindermann, the respondent, Robert Sindermann, was a
professor of Government and Social Science at Odessa Junior Col-
lege in Texas. Sindermann had taught in the Texas state college
system for ten years, the last four at Odessa during successive one-
year contracts. Odessa Junior College had no tenure system, al-
though there was a faculty-administration "understanding." 35 Dur-
ing his fourth year, Sindermann was elected president of the Texas
Junior College Teachers Association, a position which necessitated
various trips to testify before the legislature during normal class
time. In addition, he advocated the academic expansion of Odessa
Junior College into a four-year institution, a change opposed by the
administration. In May of his last year, Sindermann was informed
that this contract would not be renewed. The Board of Regents is-
sued a press release detailing his alleged insubordination, but they
provided Sindermann with "no official statement of the reasons.
* . . And they allowed him no opportunity for a hearing to chal-
lenge the basis of the nonrenewal."36
Sindermann brought suit in District Court alleging violations
of his constitutional rights to freedom of speech and due process.
He sought damages, compensatory and punitive, and reinstatement.
The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.37
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed.3 The court, in ac-
cordance with prior Fifth Circuit decisions, 9 remanded the case
for a determination of whether the professor had an "expectancy
33. Id. (footnote omitted).
34. 404 U.S. 909 (1971).
35. This "understanding" consisted primarily of a provision, termed
"unusual" by the Court, in the Faculty Guide:
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The
Administration of the College -wishes the faculty member to feel
that he has permanent tenure as long as his teaching services are
satisfactory and as long as he displays a cooperative attitude to-
ward his coworkers and his superiors, and as long as he is happy
with his work.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600 & n.6 (1972). In addition, the re-
spondent alleged reliance on the tenure guidelines promulgated by the
Texas governmental unit responsible for the state colleges and universities.
36. 408 U.S. at 595.
37. The district court decision is not officially reported. The findings
and conclusions are noted in Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 942 &
n.7 (5th Cir. 1970).
38. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970).
39. See notes 8-10 and accompanying text supra.
of employment under the policies and practices of the institu-
tion. '40 If the court below so found, it was to order notice of the
reasons for dismissal and a hearing to the professor.4 1 The court,
as did the district court in Roth42 exhibited a degree of judicial un-
certainty as to the effect of the due process requirement on the
discretionary powers of the school administration, stating:
A requirement such as plaintiff suggests, that a college
must always assign a cause for not renewing the contract
of any teacher on its staff, would have the legal effect of
improperly denying to colleges freedom of contract to em-
ploy personnel on a probationary basis or under annual
contracts which are unfettered by any reemployment obli-
gation. Every teacher would thus be granted substantial
tenure rights by court edict.
48
On appeal by the college, certiorari was granted by the Supreme
Court.
44
C. Analysis of the Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court heard the cases together, reversing the
Roth decision45 and affirming the Sindermann 'decision,46 although
not on the grounds propounded by the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. While the decisions may initially appear to reach opposite
results, they can be reconciled. Roth falls within the general rule
that "the Constitution does not require opportunity for a hearing
before the nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher's contract ....
Sindermann is an example of one of the manifold exceptions which
arise when a teacher "can show that the decision not to rehire him
deprived him of an interest in 'liberty' or that he had a 'property'
interest in continued employment, despite the lack of tenure or a
formal contract."48  The best summation of the two decisions is
found in Sindermann, as follows:
A written contract with an explicit tenure provision
clearly is evidence of a formal understanding that supports
a teacher's claim of entitlement to continued employment
unless sufficient "cause" is shown. Yet absence of such an
explicit contractual provision may not always foreclose the
possibility that a teacher has a "property" interest in re-
employment.
49
40. 430 F.2d at 943 (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 944.
42. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
43. 430 F.2d at 944.
44. 403 U.S. 917 (1971).
45. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Lower court decisions of the same case are discussed at notes 15-34 and
accompanying text supra.
46. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Lower court decisions
of the same case are discussed at notes 35-44 and accompanying text supra.
47. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972).
48. Id.
49. 408 U.S. at 601 (emphasis added).
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As is evident, the court was reluctant to resolve the problem with
any strict guidelines. The central concern was the property in-
terest of the teacher. The court decreed that in the majority of
cases the property interest vested in the nontenured teacher is in-
adequate to give rise to a statement of reasons and a hearing. The
exceptions hereinafter discussed must be evaluated in light of the
above quotation.
Dismissing first the subordinate issue presented in the cases-
whether a teacher may be fired for exercising first amendment
freedoms-the Court answered a qualified no. It did hold that the
question of tenure was not pertinent to the first amendment ques-
tion,50 but nevertheless refused to give a blanket response, re-
peating its earlier holding that a "teacher's public criticism of his
superiors ... may ... be an impermissible basis for termination of
his employment.
' '51
Turning to the central issue in the cases, the due process rights
of nontenured professors upon dismissal or nonrenewal of their
contracts, the Court enumerated various exceptions to the general
rule quoted above. The exceptions can be generally classified as
follows:
(1) deprivation of liberty
(a) damage to reputation
(b) employment stigma
(2) breach of contract
(a) term of contract
(b) implied contract
(3) noncompliance with state law, in particular tenure
and rights thereunder.
As can be seen, classifications (2) and (3) are concerned with the
property rights of the teacher. Furthermore, there is inevitable
variation depending upon each state's laws of contract. Never-
50. Id. at 597-98.
51. Id. at 598 (emphasis added). The Court cites Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) as support for this proposition, presumably re-
ferring to the balancing test therein. The magazine of the National Educa-
tion Association hails this statement as a judicial decree to the effect that
"teachers may not be denied a new contract because they have exercised a
right secured by the first amendment to the Constitution," failing to men-
tion when that right may not be so secured. TODAY's EDUCATION, Sept.,
1972 at 37. It would more realistically appear that the state of the law
remains as in Pred v. Bd. of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851, 857 (5th Cir.
1970), wherein Circuit Judge Brown stated:
[W]e must yet answer the broad question stated above.
whether state created status may be denied because of First
Amendment activities. And the answer has to be: maybe yes,
maybe no.
theless, the classifications do afford convenient guidelines for ex-
position of the Court's reasoning.
On the issue of deprivation of liberty, the Court implies that
the instances of due process requirements being necessitated by
such an infringement will be rare.5 2 For example, the Court states
that "the interest in holding a teaching job at a state university,
simpliciter, is not itself a free speech interest.""" However, two
general areas are presented where the deprivation of liberty would
invoke due process requirements. The first is aimed at the situa-
tions where the state makes any charge against the professor "that
might seriously damage his standing and associations in his com-
munity. '5 4 Even if the hearing is then required, however, the em-
ployer "may remain free to deny him future employment for other
reasons."55  Given the general holding of the cases, this exception
is relatively meaningless in terms of a professor retaining his job.
The charge could be made, the employee could refute the charge
before university officials, the employee's contract could be non-
renewed for "other reasons. ' '5 6 The exception, however, does raise
an interesting question whether a professor whose contract is not
renewed, at a time coincident with the making of unfounded asper-
sions about his character, may demand a hearing to refute the
charges. Since the state did not make any charge,57 the answer
would probably be no.
The other liberty exception is more complex: the state cannot
impose on the professor "a stigma or other disability that fore-
close Is] his freedom to take advantage of other employment op-
portunities."5 8  Read superficially, the exception appears to open
the door to a due process requirement founded simply on nonre-
newal, in that any such action could be expected to attach dubious
connotations to the professor's past employment record. The
Court, however, limits this generality by further adding:
Mere proof, for example, that his record of nonretention in
one job, taken alone, might make him somewhat less attrac-
tive to some other employers would hardly establish the
kind of foreclosure of opportunities amounting to a depri-
vation of liberty.5 9
Even with this limitation, however, the exception is open to sev-
eral interpretations. For instance, if the job in question had been
his second dismissal, would nonretention in two jobs impose a
52. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573
(1972).
53. Id. at 575 n.14.
54. Id. at 573.
55. Id. at 573 n.12.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 573.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 574 n.13 (citation omitted).
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stigma such that the second employer owed the professor a state-
ment of reasons and a hearing? Three jobs? Would notification
of nonrenewal in June for the coming school year "foreclose a range
of opportunities"? 60 Furthermore, the Court discreetly reprimands
the district court for its assumption that nonrenewal has a sub-
stantial adverse effect on career plans, and adds that "the record
contains no support for these assumptions."6 1  Conjecturally, the
best support for such assumptions would be offered by the worst
professor, in that he could offer as proof numerous job rejections,
allege that the rejections were due to the stigma of nonrenewal,
and ask the court for due process rights. The natural conclusion
to be drawn is that this exception requires more than mere non-
renewal, and in fact is closer to the first exception discussed, non-
renewal coupled with a charge against the professor.
6 2
Under the contract law exceptions, the Court reaffirms earlier
decisions mandating due process requirements for those in the pub-
lic employ under the following conditions: (1) professors dis-
missed after securing tenure;6 3 (2) professors dismissed 'during the
terms of their contracts;"4 and (3) professors dismissed without
tenure or contract, but with a "clearly implied promise of contin-
ued employment." 65 This last exception deserves consideration, for
the case in support involved a teacher hired for a full-time position
during the school year and fired shortly thereafter for failure to
take a loyalty oath. The clear implication is that any full-time
teacher dismissed during the academic term is entitled to a state-
ment of reasons and a hearing, even without a contract or tenure,
unless state law66 or the particular contract with that teacher de-
crees otherwise. Such a requirement seems but another facet of
the earlier discussed deprivation of liberty, for a mid-term dis-
missal clearly stigmatizes a teacher much more than mere nonre-
newal.
60. Id. at 574. The question may have been impliedly answered by
the Court. Note the date of Sindermann's dismissal-May, notes 35-36 and
accompanying text supra-a factor ignored by the Court in its disposition
of the case.
61. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 574
n.13 (1972).
62. See notes 52-57 and accompanying text supra.
63. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972)
citing Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). See note 81 infra.
64. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77
(1972) citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). See note 81 infra.
65. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 504, 577
(1972) citing Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971). See note 81
infra.
66. See notes 73-76 and accompanying text infra.
The implied contract exception was the deciding factor in the
Sindermann case. Without holding as a matter of law that Sinder-
mann had a "legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure, '"7 in
turn requiring a statement of reasons and a hearing, the Court did
remand the case for a determination of whether Sindermann could
prove such a claim.68 The policy paper 9 suggesting that Odessa
Junior College had a system of de facto tenure was determinative.
In citing 3 Corbin on Contracts, §§ 561-672A10 to exemplify those
instances when a property interest could arise by implication, the
Court may have introduced numerous litigation possibilities. Any
such instances, however, must be evaluated within the circumspec-
tion provided by the Court:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He
must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He
must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.
71
In addition, the Court specifically rejects the Fifth Circuit's em-
phasis on a mere "expectancy of continued employment.'7 2 Re-
gardless of the strictures placed by the Court on this exception, it
could safely be predicted that the issue of implied contracts will be
the foundation of most future cases because of the possibilities un-
der this theory. For instance, most teachers will be informed upon
hiring that they can expect tenure in a certain amount of time,
either by statute or institutional policy. It is submitted that such
a statement implies no more promise of continued employment
for that period of time than does the explanation of pension plans
to the management trainee.
In any event, the final determination of whether an interest,
contractual or otherwise, rises to the level of a property interest is
left by the Court to the states. T Chief Justice Burger, in an
opinion concurring with both decisions, 74 even urges federal courts
to abstain from any determination of state-defined property rights
"[i] f relevant state contract law is unclear. . . .,,T5 Obviously,
the states will in most instances define eligibility for tenure. In the
present cases, Wisconsin statutes 76 were complied with in the Roth
nonrenewal. In Sindermann's position, no such statutes were ap-
plicable, so the institutional practices became paramount. Subse-
67. 408 U.S. at 602.
68. Id. at 603.
69. See note 35 supra.
70. 408 U.S. at 602.
71. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972).
72. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972).
73. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972).
74. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 603 (1972).
75. Id.
76. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
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quent cases will thus be decided on the issue of relevant state law,
an exposition of which will not be attempted herein.
In addition to a unilateral expectation of a property right being
insufficient to invoke due process requirements,77 the Court men-
tions several other occasions when the proof will fall short of that
necessary to even consider one of the exceptions. For instance, a
"mere showing that [the teacher] was not rehired on one job, with-
out more, [does] not amount to a showing of a loss of liberty
. . . [or] loss of property. 781 Also the suggestion by the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals that a professor may demand due process if
he simply asserts that the nonrenewal was based on constitution-
ally impermissible grounds is explicitly rejected.
79
Broadly, the Supreme Court in Roth and Sindermann has de-
nied the automatic right to a statement of reasons and a hearing to
any nontenured professor under state auspices whose contract
has not been renewed. Given the inherent conflict between the
discretionary powers necessary in any employer-employee relation-
ship and the right to pursue constitutionally protected freedoms,
particularly when the employer is the state, the decisions reflect
an effective compromise. Because of the exceptions,80 the decisions
will, at a minimum, clarify the issues that will be central in future
cases involving the due process rights of nontenured teachers.
D. Earlier Cases
casesr used byar theu Crtin suppo;Yic rtr o-f the Roth nd
Sindermann decisions concerned peripheral issues.81 Cases on the
77. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
78. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972).
79. Id. at 599 n.5; Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 575 n.14 (1972).
80. See notes 51-75 and accompanying text supra.
81. Previous cases serving as the most useful analogy concerned state
denial of employment for reasons offensive to the first amendment. For
instance, Pickering v. Bd. of Township High School Dist., 391 U.S. 563
(1968) (published criticism of administration officials); Keyishian v. Bd.
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (refusal to sign certificate disavowing com-
munism); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (required disclosure of
organizations to which teacher belonged); and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952) (failure to take loyalty oath) were all cited in support of
the "general principle" that the state "may not deny a benefit to a person
on a basis that infringes upon his constitutionally protected interest-
especially, his interest in freedom of speech." Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 596 (1972). Two other cases used by the Court throughout the
decisions concerned fifth amendment privileges (Slochower v. Bd. of Higher
Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) ), and due process rights accruing to a teacher
dismissed during the school term (Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207
(1971) ).
nonrenewal issue preceding the decisions were lower court deci-
sions, some of which have been previously discussed.8 2 Several
other such cases bear mention either because of the result reached
prior to Roth and Sindermann or because the fact situations afford
a convenient vehicle for a projection of future results.
The most important lower court decision concerning the issue
is Orr v. Trinter,8 for the following reasons: (1) the case presents
a cogent summation of the law as it stood before the Supreme
Court determination; (2) the reasoning closely parallels that of the
Supreme Court; and (3) certiorari was denied the same day Roth
and Sindermann were handed down. The importance of a denial
of certiorari is legally debatable, but nevertheless lower courts do
take careful note of such action8 4 and the case could have as easily
been remanded for further proceedings consistent with Roth and
Sindermann (as was -done the same day with a case granting rea-
sons and a hearing to a dismissed probationary teacher)8 5 if in
fact the case were inconsistent.8 " In addition, the case was cited by
the Supreme Court to support the proposition that some lower
courts have held that no procedural safeguards are required, 7 a
clear demonstration of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
holding. Furthermore, the similarity of the court's rationale to the
Supreme Court's ultimate determination provides an additional
reason for elevating the denial of certiorari to affirmation sub
silentio.
The court of appeals in Trinter -denied the benefits of a state-
ment of reason and a hearing to a probationary high school teacher
whose contract was not renewed, reasoning as follows:
[I] n the unique situation of a probationary school teacher,
the failure to give reasons for the refusal to rehire is not
arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the Board
since the very reason for the probationary period is to give
the Board a chance to evaluate the teacher without making
a commitment to rehire him. A nontenured teacher's in-
terest in knowing the reasons for the nonrenewal of his
contract and in confronting the Board on those reasons is
not sufficient to outweigh the interest of the Board in free
and independent action with respect to the employment of
probationary teachers. 88
82. See notes 4-11 and accompanying text supra.
83. 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972).
84. See, e.g., Shields v. Watrel, 336 F. Supp. 260, 263 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
85. Thomas v. Shirck, 408 U.S. 940 (1972) (remanded for proceedings
consistent with Roth).
86. For a general discussion of the importance of a denial of certiorari,
see Honus, Denial of Certiorari and Supreme Court Policy-Making, 17 Am.
U.L. REV. 41 (1967).
87. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 n.6
(1972).
88. 444 F.2d at 135.
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The nonrenewal was in accordance with the Ohio statute,8 9 a factor
that cannot be ignored in any analysis of the reason for the denial
of certiorari.90 The court refused to "amend the Ohio statute by
judicial decree" to "confer certain tenure privileges upon nonten-
ured teachers. ... 91 Under the Roth and Sindermann rationale,
no change would be expected in situations similar to this.
In Henry v. Coahama County Board of Education,92 another
lower court decision of note, the teacher involved had been em-
ployed in the same school district for eleven years. There were no
tenure provisions. To be rehired, the teacher needed the recom-
mendation of the County Superintendent. Since the recommenda-
tion was refused, the teacher sought an injunction requiring a new
contract, alleging that the nonrenewal was based at least in part on
involvement with the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People. The district court upheld the discretionary power
of the County Superintendent not to renew without a hearing or
statement of reasons. Under the Roth and Sindermann approach,
the teacher would seem to be eligible to contend that a de facto
tenure system existed, or, alternatively, that the expectation of
continued employment was more than merely unilateral after
eleven successive contracts. It remains to be seen whether de facto
tenure can be acquired by mere longevity alone, absent any ex-
plicit representations as were present in Sindermann.92 3 The issue
of an objective expectation of continued employment would proba-
bly involve a factual determination concerning, among other fac-
tors, the number of people with over ten years' employment who
are not rehired annually and the statute involved. Because of the
Supreme Court's stated propensity to follow state law9 4 in such
situations, however, the final result may be a Pyrrhic victory: a
court-ordered statement of reasons and a hearing but an upholding
of the statutory scheme for dismissal. This type of situation can
be expected to arise in future litigation involving non-teachers em-
89. Id. at 130. The court applies the pertinent Ohio statute, OMO.
REv. CODE ANN. § 3319.11 (1971), a provision similar to applicable Penn-
sylvania statutes; see notes 97-105 and accompanying text infra. Under the
Ohio statute, a teacher is deemed re-employed unless notified to the con-
trary. It is of interest to note that the court, while not explicitly addressing
the issue, made no mention of any promise of continued employment
implicit in such a provision. See notes 62-71 and accompanying text supra.
See also notes 126-132 and accompanying text infra.
90. See notes 73-76 and accompanying text supra.
91. 444 F.2d 128, 135 (6th Cir. 1971).
92. 246 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Miss. 1963), affd, 353 F.2d 648 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 962 (1966).
93. See note 35 supra.
94. See notes 73-76 and accompanying text supra.
ployed by a state-controlled institution such as secretaries at a state
college. Without any controlling tenure provisions, the question
of whether such employees can demand a statement of reasons and
a hearing will be determined by the point in time that they acquire
an objective expectancy of continued employment.
In such situations, the comparison to teachers may present a
legal anomaly. If a state college has very explicit tenure provi-
sions which grant tenure upon reaching the seventh year of con-
tinued employment, and further negative any expectancy of con-
tinued employment prior to that time, a professor fired after six
years would have no recourse to a statement of reasons or a hearing
under Roth and Sindermann (assuming no other conditions). A
secretary dismissed after six years, however, may be able to prove
that no secretaries were ever fired who worked longer than five
years, therefore she had a legitimate claim of entitlement to con-
tinued employment. The college at that point would be found to
have violated constitutionally required due process protections,
and she would be entitled to the appropriate remedies.9 5 In such
situations, the lack of explicit tenure provisions to negate any im-
plied promises may be fortuitous for the employees involved.
II. PENNSYLVANIA EFFECT
In light of the Supreme Court's emphasis on applicable state
law as the ultimate measure of property rights in any individual
case, 96 the pertinent law of Pennsylvania will be examined. A
survey of prior law is helpful in this regard, but somewhat defi-
cient because the law on the question of due process rights of non-
tenured teachers was seldom litigated along the same issues as
those that proved central to the Supreme Court determination.
Chief among those issues is the problem of implied contracts,97 the
nature of which can be as varied as the facts in any case. It is
hoped, however, that present statutes and prior cases on related
issues will serve as some indicia of future results.
A. Statutes
Pennsylvania statutory law applicable to teachers in public
schools and state-controlled universities is not uniform. In public
schools, tenure is explicit and controlled completely by the relevant
statutes; 9 in state colleges and universities, complete discretion is
left to the individual universities and the state departments under
which they operate.9 9 Although courts have had no insurmounta-
95. See, e.g., Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969)
(teacher granted reinstatement and back pay).
96. See notes 73-76 and accompanying text supra.
97. See notes 63-72 and accompanying text supra.
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1101 to -1194 (Supp. 1972).
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 20-2003.1 to -2008.3 (Supp. 1972).
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ble problems implementing the statutes, the draftsmanship has
been classified as careless and inarticulate by at least one court. 00
Nontenured public school teachers are, for statutory purposes,
"temporary professional employees." 10 1  These teachers must be
rated at least semi-annually, and if found satisfactory throughout
the two-year probationary period, the teacher becomes a "profes-
sional employe," and tenure is acquired. 10 2 Prior to the acquisition
of tenure, the teacher may be dismissed for an unsatisfactory rat-
ing, but must be furnished with a written notification of the rat-
ing. 1
03
Roth and Sinderman should have little effect on the statutory
scheme for tenure at public schools. If anything, because of the
Court's concern with state law, and since the Pennsylvania statu-
tory law quite explicitly establishes the criteria for the attainment
of tenure, the cases should merely buttress the obvious: no objec-
tive property right to the status of a temporary professional em-
ployee can vest before tenure is acquired. The Pennsylvania stat-
utes in implementation differ little from the statute under con-
sideration in Roth,10 4 except that Pennsylvania requires notifica-
tion for an unsatisfactory rating. 0 5 Given the state tenure law
and the Roth decision, nontenured public school teachers who are
dismissed in accordance with the statute should find little recourse
to further due process considerations.
Contrary to the state-controlled tenure in public schools, state-
reated universities are given broad mandates to estblih ther
own tenure policies.106 In lieu of state statutes governing tenure,
the policies of the individual institution or the contracts made by
that institution with its faculty become paramount.
B. Prior Cases
Pennsylvania law, as construed by the courts, has granted few
due process rights to nontenured professors in excess of those
granted by statute.'0 7 Of primary importance because of its direct
bearing on the question of the due process considerations owed to
100. Johnson v. United School Dist. Joint School Bd., 201 Pa. Super.
375, 381, 191 A.2d 897, 901 (1963).
101. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1101(c) (Supp. 1972).
102. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1108(b) (Supp. 1972).
103. Id. at § 11-1108(c).
104. See note 14 supra.
105. See note 103 and accompanying text supra.
106. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
107. See, e.g., Shields v. Watrel, 333 F. Supp. 260 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
a nontenured professor is the case of Shields v. Watrel. 08 The
district court in that case stated:
As a non-tenured professor, Mr. Shields is essentially
a probationary state employee. Too, the analogy extends
to the state which has an important interest in staffing its
state colleges and universities with the most competent
available professors. Indeed, that interest would seem to
underlie the traditional system of tenure. To infringe upon
the discretion of the state higher education officials in de-
ciding which of its nontenured professors or instructors
should be retained and which should be released by requir-
ing an administrative hearing for every release would be
to unnecessarily burden the administration of the state
higher education system. Certainly the state must be free
to exercise its discretion, indeed its duty, to retain or grant
tenure only to those professors who in the unfettered
judgment of the state officials merit retention or tenure
without having to endlessly record reasons for terminating
the employment of those who are not retained or granted
tenure. Otherwise, the courts would clothe all untenured
teachers with the important incidents of tenure and
thereby emasculate the system.'0 9
Because of the relatively little extra-statutory difference between
nontenured state college professors and public school teachers," 0
the decision should apply to public school teachers also. The de-
cision is strengthened by the parallels between the court's reason-
ing and the reasoning in Roth and Sindermann.
In Grausam v. Murphy,"' the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
was confronted with a situation similar to that of the nontenured
teacher: a probationary state employee at a state hospital was dis-
missed and one of his subsequent contentions concerned the right
to a statement of reasons and a hearing prior to dismissal. The
analogies between the probationary state employee and the pro-
bationary school teacher are several, including the applicable stat-
utes and the dismissal procedures 1 2 The court upheld the power
of the administrators to dismiss the employee on the basis of the
considerable interest of the state "in obtaining employees who satis-
factorily provide the important public services performed by it,
and in replacing those who do not .... ,,13 Regarding the interest
of the employee, the court stated:
108. Id.
109. Id. at 264.
110. Id. at 263 n.5:
"Teacher" here is used loosely and generically to mean educators
from university professors to grammar school teachers, there being
for present purposes no legal distinction.
111. 448 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1971).
112. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.603 (Supp. 1972) with PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1108 (Supp. 1972). In both instances dismissal is
possible for unsatisfactory performance, although the measuring standard
is more flexible in the former.
113. 448 F.2d at 206.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
By the very fact that he was on probation, his eligibility
and right to hold his position were in the process of deter-
mination. Any interest in or right to his post during pro-
bation was at best conditional, and, absent a discrimina-
tory severance, dependent upon his own performance in
proving his ability to successfully satisfy the demands of
that position.
114
This decision and the decision in Shields v. Watrel illustrate that
federal court decisions applying Pennsylvania law were in accord
with the subsequent admonitions of Roth and Sindermann;1 5 few
due process rights were found other than those specified by statute.
There would be little cause to expect further relaxation of the
court's Stance after the Supreme Court decisions.
In state courts, two decisions merit consideration. The most
recent is Nicolella v. School Board of the Trinity Area School
District, Washington County." 6  In that case, a school teacher
sought a mandamus order requiring reinstatement because of "bad
faith and disregard of the requirements of the School Code" 117 on
the part of the Board. The teacher had been given a hearing, a
fact which the court cited as exemplifying the Board's fairness be-
cause of the lack of any such requirement."l8 The teacher had
been rated unsatisfactory, a factor which the court stated "is the
only prerequisite necessary for dismissal by the Board absent a
showing of bad faith or arbitrary and capricious action on the part
of the Board."1 9 The teacher had contended that the hearing was
invalid. Judge McCune, presiding at the lower court determina-
tion, was even more succinct in his appraisal of such a contention:
Our understanding of the law is that once rated un-
satisfactory he is not entitled to a hearing upon dismissal
so the validity of the hearing which was granted is inconse-
quential. Failure to hold a hearing does not violate the due
process clause of the Constitution of the United States or of
Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution where
temporary professional employees are concerned.
°2 0
In the case the courts used as support for the preceding opin-
ions, the appellant, a temporary professional employee, alleged that
the denial of a hearing prior to dismissal was a violation of due
114. Id.
115. See notes 45-49 and accompanying text supra.
116. 444 Pa. 541, 281 A.2d 832 (1971).
117. Id. at 548, 281 A.2d at 834.
118. Id. at 650, 281 A.2d at 835.
119. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
120. Nicolella v. School Bd. of Trinity Area School Dist., 49 Wash. Co.
1, 3 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
process.12l The court, construing the school code, held that there
was "no provision in this statute authorizing or providing for a
hearing for a temporary teacher who desired to obtain permanent
status. ..,122 and further that without any such requirement
"plaintiff had no property or other vested right in or to the posi-
tion of status of a permanent teacher."'1 23  This holding will be a
fundamental source of legal authority for any future litigation
based on Roth and Sindermann, for the court identifies (1) the uni-
lateral expectation of a teacher in her attainment of permanent
status,124 and (2) the lack of a property right in the desire to attain
tenure. 1
25
C. Pennsylvania Law in Regard to the Exceptions
Having established by case law and statutory authority that
the nontenured teacher has no automatic right to a statement of
reasons or a hearing upon nonrenewal of his contract,126 the vari-
ous exceptions enunciated by the Supreme Court must be exam-
ined to determine their applicability in Pennyslvania cases. No dis-
cussion of the deprivation of liberty exception will be presented, as
such cases are peculiarly adapted to the facts in each case.
Because of the myriad types of implied contracts, it is sub-
mitted that the majority of future cases will center on this issue.
Implied contracts are of such a diverse nature that only those
based on applicable statutes will be presented. It is admitted that
many varieties of implied contracts may be raised in any employer-
employee relationship. It is hoped, however, that by a discussion
of one such contention the general issues applicable to others will
be, if not disposed of, at least brought to light.
Presumably the contract of employment will specify that the
terms of the contract are subject to the temporary professional
employee statutes, 2 7 in cases involving public school teachers.
Given such a reference, the contention will probably be raised that
the implied -duration of the contract is concomitant with the length
specified in the statutes, i.e. two years (even though the contract is
a one-year contract), and that furthermore the teacher has an ob-
jective expectancy of continued employment until that time.
Should the court accept such a syllogism, the teacher, now pos-
sessed of the requisite objective expectancy, 28 deserves a statement
121. Travis v. Teter, 270 Pa. 326, 87 A.2d 177 (1952).
122. Id. at 337, 87 A.2d at 182 (emphasis added).
123. Id.
124. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
125. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
126. See notes 96-125 and accompanying text supra.
127. See, e.g., Johnson v. United School Dist. Joint School Bd., 201 Pa.
Super. 375, 191 A.2d 897 (1963). See also notes 98-106 and accompanying
text supra.
128. See notes 67-72 and accompanying text supra.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
of reasons and a hearing, even without any statutory requirements.
This argument rests on the assumption, however, that an incor-
porated reference to a statute, in which a length of time is speci-
fied, is sufficient to imply employment for that length of time.
The fallacy in the argument is found in Corbin on Contracts, used
by the Supreme Court 129 to allow the implied contracts exception
in provable instances:
[W] here the parties have made an express contract, the
court should not find a different one by "implication" con-
cerning the same subject matter, if the evidence does not
justify an inference that they intended to make one. 18 0
Given a one-year contract and a two-year statutory period, an in-
ference that the parties impliedly contracted for two years would
be unsupportable. 1 Nevertheless, the point has been raised, and
dismissed, in predictable fashion:
The language appears clear that a 10-month term was con-
templated and the provision regarding the continuation for
two years is declaratory of section 1108 of the school code
regarding eligibility for tenure by a temporary professional
employee. We believe this does not contradict the clear
language of the contract indicating the duration thereof.
132
If in fact the contract of employment stated no term but did incor-
porate a reference to the school code, a dubious situation, the con-
tention could be raised that the implied term was for the two-year
period specified in the statute as the length of temporary profes-
sional employee status. Against such an implication would be the
argument that any teaching contract without a stated duration
implies continued employment for the length of the school year
only, an argument not only more feasible but supported by the
Supreme Court.13
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has held that a contract
in which the annual compensation for the academic year was
stated, subject to the provision that the contract could be termi-
nated by either party with eighty days' notice, gave the teacher
129. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972). See note 70 and
accompanying text supra.
130. 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 564 (2d ed. 1960).
131. In addition to the legal fallibility of the argument, the defining
statute further rejects the inference by embracing only those teachers em-
ployed "for a limited time." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1101(c) (Supp.
1972).
132. Goodwin v. Centre County Bd. of Educ., 55 Pa. D. & C.2d 134
(C.P. Centre, 1970).
133. Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971), as construed in
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (by
implication).
"no affirmative right to employment throughout that period [the
academic year] ."134 Thus the Pennsylvania courts that have con-
fronted the issue of implied contracts in teachers' contracts are in
accord with both Corbin's circumscriptions' 8 5 and the presumed in-
tent of the Supreme Court to restrict the use of the implied con-
tracts exception.'
8 6
Because of the restrictions on implied contracts in teachers'
contracts,'13 it can be expected that more faculties and adminis-
trations will desire an express delineation of the due process rights
of the teachers. With the advent of collective bargaining by facul-
ties, the natural result would be to place such provisions in the ne-
gotiated contracts. At the present public school level, little pro-
tection in the form of due process rights is given the nontenured
teacher beyond that provided by law even in such negotiated con-
tracts.
38
At the college level, however, one such contract is particu-
larly important because of the number of state-controlled univer-
sities affected by it. The contract, effective November 2, 1971, is
between the Association of Pennsylvania State College and Uni-
versity Faculties/Pennsylvania Association for Higher Education
and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 3 9 The contract embraces
fourteen state colleges and universities throughout the Common-
wealth. 140  The procedure upon nonrenewal is carefully detailed:
In the event a first year FACULTY MEMBER is de-
nied renewal, the reason for such denial shall be given to
the individual in writing, if requested; but he shall have
no recourse to the provisions of Article V, hereof, GRIEV-
ANCE PROCEDURE AND ARBITRATION. The FAC-
ULTY MEMBER, however, shall retain such rights as may
be provided him by law.
141
Once a faculty member reaches his second year of service, he does
have access to the arbitration procedures enumerated in the con-
tract.' 42 The elements of the procedure to be followed in the non-
134. Tishock v. Tohickon Valley Joint School Bd., 181 Pa. Super. 278,
280, 124 A.2d 148, 149 (1956).
135. See note 130 and accompanying text supra.
136. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
137. See notes 127-133 and accompanying text supra.
138. Most such contracts examined by the author establish dismissal
procedures but the provisions are generally administrative. In those sit-
uations in which the nontenured teacher obtains a contractual right to due
process considerations in excess of those provided by law, quite obviously
the contract will control.
139. Collective Bargaining Agreement between Ass'n. of Pa. State Col-
lege and Univ. Faculties/Pa. Ass'n. for Higher Educ. and Commonwealth
of Pa. (1971) [hereinafter cited as Bargaining Agreement].
140. The colleges and universities are as follows: Bloomsburg, Cal-
ifornia, Cheyney, Clarion, East Stroudsburg, Edinboro, Indiana University,
Kutztown, Lock Haven, Mansfield, Millersville, Shippensburg, Slippery
Rock, and West Chester.
141. Bargaining Agreement, supra note 139, at Article XIV, § c.
142. Id. at Article V.
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renewal of first-year professors deserve mention: (1) the right to
a statement of reasons but not a hearing after notification of non-
renewal, and (2) the burden of requesting such a statement is
upon the individual fired.1 43 In the event that the proper nonre-
newal procedures are not followed, the teacher's contract is auto-
matically renewed. Given such explicit procedures, it is difficult
to envision situations (other than the deprivation of liberty rari-
ties) wherein a dismissed one-year professor at a state college will
have any recourse to a claim of due process denial.
Despite the detailed procedures governing those schools af-
fected by the above contract, at the remainder of colleges and uni-
versities in the Commonwealth, both state-controlled and private,
"there is a general lack of procedure guaranteeing due process in
the case of nonreappointment of nontenured faculty."'u 4 Because
each such school is governed by its own particular policies, no
composite rule can be established encompassing those situations
when a teacher whose contract has not been renewed deserves a
statement of reasons and hearing.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, confronted with the judicial and academic
controversy surrounding the nonrenewal of nontenured teachers,
has responded by holding that, in the majority of cases, the interest
of the institution in staffing its facilities with competent faculty
deserves greater protection than the individual professors whose
contracts have been terminated. The decisions are compatible
with existing Pennsylvania statutory and case law; the effect of the
decisions should be negligible in regard to teachers without tenure
whose contracts have been terminated.
145
At the public school level, Pennsylvania should fall within the
ambit of the Roth decision-no right to a statement of reasons or
hearing accrues automatically because of the statutory provisions
for nonrenewal. 146 At the higher education level, the presence of
a sufficient property interest to invoke due process considerations
will depend on the institution involved, although it can safely be
assumed that every such institution has some form of explicit ten-
143. See note 141 and accompanying text supra.
144. Interview with Dr. Wallace H. Maurer, Chief of Division of
Faculty Services, Pennsylvania Office of Higher Education in Harrisburg,
Pa., September 21, 1972. Numerous faculty guides were exhibited as sup-
port for the statement.
145. Compare notes 45-80 and accompanying text supra with notes 98-
125 and accompanying text supra.
146. See notes 98-106 and accompanying text supra.
ure system. If in fact the institution has actual tenure, the claim of
de facto tenure should be effectively negated.
147
Thus any future Pennsylvania litigation on the question of
due process rights of nontenured professors will center on the ex-
ceptions enunciated in the Roth and Sindermann decisions. 148  As
stated previously, cases involving deprivation of liberty are com-
pletely dependent on the facts of the case. School officials can
avoid needless litigation on such a question by (1) complying with
the applicable statutes for nonrenewal in the case of public school
teachers, and (2) avoiding any accusations against dismissed pro-
fessors that would require later substantiation at a hearing.
1 49
The other primary exception applicable to every state will be
that of contracts, both express and implied. In regard to express
contracts, the presence of any provision guaranteeing a statement
of reasons or a hearing is a function of the parties involved. If
the school wishes to expressly obviate the need for any such condi-
tions beyond those provided by statute or constitutional guaran-
tees, it can insert such a provision in the contract. The benefit of
such a course would be that the school would enjoy the widest pos-
sible latitude in selecting its faculties.
Implied contracts will predictably cause the most consterna-
tion. 15 0 If in fact the current market is in favor of the schools,
several fundamental clauses can be inserted in individual con-
tracts that would negative most implied contracts. For instance,
the standard integration clause, found in many contracts, to the ef-
fect that there are no collateral or prior agreements between the
parties not included in the contract, could easily be added to
teacher employment contracts. Furthermore, assuming a reference
to the school code is incorporated in most public school contracts,
it would be prudent to add a provision to the effect that such a
reference in no manner affects the express duration of the con-
tract. 51 At the college level, the professor should be given written
notice to the effect that none of the benefits of tenure accrue to
those who have not acquired it, other than those expressly granted
by the individual institution.
Since the prior state of Pennsylvania law conformed with the
Roth and Sindermann decisions, the Supreme Court stance can be
readily absorbed into the existing legal framework. Implementa-
tion of the Court decisions should be a relatively easy procedure
for the courts and schools of the Commonwealth.
WAYNE A. BROMFIELD
147. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
148. See notes 52-76 and accompanying text supra.
149. See notes 52-62 and accompanying text supra.
150. See notes 67-72 and 125-135 and accompanying text supra.
151. See notes 127-131 and accompanying text supra.
